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Tor ye know the Heart of the 
Stranger': Empathy, Memory, 
and the Biblical Ideal 
of a 'Decent Society'
fan Assmann
The biblical story of the Exodus tells the miraculous escape of the 
Israelites from thraldom in Egypt. In doing so it has once and for all 
denigrated the image of Ancient Egypt in the memory of humanity as 
the epitome of despotism, slavery and cruel oppression. This image, we 
must add, has no traces in historical reality, but fulfils first and foremost 
an important narrative function. The story follows the typical pattern in 
which 'a lack' is transformed into the liquidation of this lack,1 leading 
from a bad state of extreme oppression, godforsakeness, and humiliation 
to the highest possible status and divine presence. In order to present 
the finally achieved status - the Israelites as a Chosen People in the cov­
enant with God - in the brilliant light of freedom, justice, and dignity, 
it must be shown against the backdrop of a situation that paints the 
plight and the helplessness of the Israelites in glaring colours. The core 
of the story, however, is not about the relationship between Israelites 
and Egyptians, but about the inner transformation of the chosen people 
on its path from serfdom to freedom. The Egyptians have had to live 
with this unfavourable biblical portrait of their Pharaonic past, which 
was even politically instrumentalized in the Arab Spring in 2012, when 
Mubarak was stigmatized as 'fira'&ri (Pharaoh) on posters and graffiti. 
With Ridley Scott's new film Exodus, the Egyptian response has moved 
into a new direction. The officials of the state were again offended and 
banned the film because of an important 'historical inaccuracy'. The 
Egyptians, proud of their pyramids as World Heritage Sites, now reject 
the view that it was the Hebrews who built their key monuments.
The memory of the sojourn of the Hebrews in Egypt plays an impor­
tant role in the Bible, especially in the Pentateuch. Its function, how­
ever, is everything but a foundation of hatred and vengeance towards
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the Egyptians. On the contrary, it may even serve as the foundation of 
empathy towards those who are in a comparable situation. The crucial 
passage from the book of Exodus reads: 'And thou shalt not oppress a 
stranger for ye know the heart (naepoeS) of the stranger, seeing that ye 
were strangers in the land of Egypt' (Exod. 23: 9).2 The Hebrew word 
ncepceS belongs to a triad of terms referring to the concept of inner self, 
the other two being leb/lebab 'heart' and neshama 'soul'. The meaning of 
ncepceS points in the direction of 'vital force' or 'vitality' and has more 
to do with the emotional than the intellectual self; oppression will 
severely damage the vital force, the elan vital of a person who lives as 
a stranger amongst the Israelites.3 The outstanding importance of this 
verse lies in the fact that it formulates a concept of empathy ('knowing 
the inner self of the other')4 and relates it to the faculty of memory. 
Before further elaborating on this concept, I will briefly outline the 
context in which this striking utterance occurs.
The book of Exodus tells of God's liberation of the Israelites from 
Egyptian bondage. He sends them a savior, Moses, who leads them 
to Mt. Sinai, where God forms an alliance with the fugitives that is 
based on a corpus of commandments and laws which he reveals to 
them directly (the Decalogue) and by mediation of Moses: the 'Book 
of the Covenant' or 'Covenant Code'. The main part of this latter code 
contains a collection of formal laws (with sanctions) and moral admo­
nitions (without sanctions). This combination of penal law and moral 
exhortation serves as a constitution, by which the group of fugitives is 
to be organized as a social, political, and spiritual community - a 'holy 
people and a kingdom of priests' (Exod. 19: 6).
We are dealing here with an idea of law and justice that is very differ­
ent from what we understand by Taw' in our Western tradition, because 
it is based not only on law but also on mercy, which in our tradition 
is considered rather the opposite than a supplement of law. The juridi­
cal aspect of this constitution deals with criminals of various sorts and 
prescribes their adequate punishments. The 'mercy' aspect, however, 
deals with the underprivileged whose lot Is to be relieved not by action­
able rights but by appeals to the beneficence of the privileged. It is this 
system that Nietzsche had denounced as 'slave morality' - based on the 
resentment of the notorious underdogs against the rich and powerful 
that he deems typical of the Judeo-Christian tradition. By far the most 
maxims of Biblical morals, however, have their parallels in Ancient 
Egyptian and Babylonian wisdom literature, where they form the ideol­
ogy of the elite. In the context of the Egyptian and Ancient Oriental 
kingdoms, we meet with the same idea of a 'saving justice' (rettende
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Gerechtigkeif), where 'judging' (Richten) and 'saving' (Retteri) belong inex­
tricably together.5 There, however, this rescuing aspect of justice is never 
associated with empathy and memory, but with a concept of 'vertical 
solidarity' (beneficence from above, loyalty from below) that is primar­
ily the matter of the state and its officials. It is the king who is respon­
sible for establishing a concept and a sphere of justice on earth, where 
the criminal will be punished and the poor and underprivileged will be 
protected against oppression and exploitation on the part of the strong 
and mighty.6 The great innovation of the Biblical idea of 'saving justice' 
is to transform this political concept of a patriarchal welfare state based 
on vertical solidarity into a primarily ethical concept of brotherhood or 
'horizontal solidarity' based on individual empathy and memory. To be 
sure, there is also a vertical axis involved here, because we are dealing 
with divine justice. The idea of divine justice is the core concept of the 
new ideas of religion and society that are instituted with the 'covenant' 
at Mt. Sinai. Until then, gods were believed to act as judges, watching 
over the strict observance of the laws, but never as lawgivers themselves. 
This was the role of the king to whom the gods delegated to install 
justice on earth.7 By replacing this traditional concept of royal justice 
with the novel concept of divine justice, the Torah withdraws the law 
from human manipulation but keeps the vertical axis. The alliance or 
'covenant' (b'rit) that God offers the Israelites and the constitution he 
gives them do not just mean freedom (Hebr. kherut, a term not attested 
in Biblical language), but 'service' (avodah), the same term that is used 
for the Egyptian bondage. The difference and the principle of liberation 
lie in the fact that the Egyptian service is directed towards Pharaoh, a 
human being, and the service of the Chosen People is directed towards 
God. Divine service and divine justice save humans from human 
oppression as symbolized by 'Egypt'. In practising justice and mercy, the 
Israelites are summoned to follow the model of God who is
merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and 
truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgres­
sion and sin, but leaves no crime unpunished, visiting the iniquity 
of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, 
unto the third and to the fourth generation.
(Exod. 34: 6-7)
It is the 'mercy' aspect of Israelite law that is elaborated in the sec­
ond collection of the 'Book of the Covenant' (scepaer ha-b'rit), which 
concerns the handling of the underprivileged.8 It starts and ends with
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admonitions concerning the stranger, beginning with Chapter 22, verse 
21: 'Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were 
strangers in the land of Egypt' and ending with our verse Chapter 23, 
verse 9: 'Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of 
a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt'. The topic how 
to deal with a stranger could not be given more prominence in this act 
of mercy-legislation.9
The stranger appears as the most important member of the class of 
the underprivileged which comprises, moreover, the poor, widows and 
orphans, and sometimes even the Levites, because they are excluded 
from land-ownership and thus dependent on the beneficence of the 
society. We meet this group again and again in the Torah. These admoni­
tions are often accompanied by a reminder of the sojourn in Egypt and 
the suffering under Egyptian oppression (the 'Egypt-'efred-formula').10
The most general and principal formulations appear in Deuteronomy 
and Leviticus:
For the LORD your God is God of gods, and Lord of lords, a great 
God, a mighty, and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor 
taketh reward: he doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and 
widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment. Love 
ye therefore the stranger: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.
(Deut. 10: 17-19)
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex 
him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as 
one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were 
strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.
(Lev 19: 33-34)
Other admonitions concern special devices to lighten the situation of 
the poor and the stranger, e.g. the prohibition of gleanings. To glean 
should be the right of the poor and the stranger:
Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger, nor of the 
fatherless; nor take a widow's raiment to pledge: but thou shalt 
remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt, and the LORD thy God 
redeemed thee thence: therefore I command thee to do this thing. 
When thou cuttest down thine harvest in thy field, and hast forgot 
a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it: it shall be for 
the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow: that the LORD 
thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hands. When thou
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beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again: it 
shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow. When 
thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it 
afterward: it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the 
widow. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the 
land of Egypt: therefore I command thee to do this thing.
(Deut. 24: 17-22; cf. Lev. 19:10 [vineyard] and 23:22 [field])
Also very characteristic of this spirit of mercy and solidarity are the 
exhortations to integrate the stranger into the community by celebrat­
ing the Shabbat and the great festivals. Thus the Book of Exodus pre­
scribes, concerning the feast of Passover:
And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the 
Passover to the LORD, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him 
come near and keep it; and he shall be as one that is born in the land: 
for no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof. One law shall be to him 
that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you.
(Exod. 12: 48-49)
Similarly in Numbers:
And if a stranger shall sojourn among you, and will keep the Passover 
unto the LORD; according to the ordinance of the Passover, and 
according to the manner thereof, so shall he do: ye shall have one 
ordinance, both for the stranger, and for him that was born in the 
land.
(Num. 9: 14)
The idea that there should be one common law for the stranger and for 
the Israelites is emphasized again concerning the presentation of burnt 
sacrifice:
And if a stranger sojourn with you, or whosoever be among you in 
your generations, and will offer an offering made by fire, of a sweet 
savour unto the LORD; as ye do, so he shall do. One ordinance shall 
be both for you of the congregation, and also for the stranger that 
sojourneth with you, an ordinance for ever in your generations: as ye 
are, so shall the stranger be before the LORD. One law and one man­
ner shall be for you, and for the stranger that sojourneth with you.
(Num. 15: 14-16)
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It is interesting to see that the principle of equality before the law seems 
to extend only to the participation in feasts and offerings, but these are 
the very occasions of celebrating community and solidarity. 
Concerning the feasts of Shavuot and Sukkot, we read in Deuteronomy:
Thou shalt rejoice before the LORD thy God, thou, and thy son, and 
thy daughter, and thy manservant, and thy maidservant, and the 
Levite that is within thy gates, and the stranger, and the fatherless, 
and the widow, that among you, in the place which the LORD thy 
God hath chosen to place his name there. And thou shalt remember 
that thou wast a bondman in Egypt: and thou shalt observe and do 
these statutes.
Thou shalt observe the feast of tabernacles seven days, after that thou 
hast gathered in thy corn and thy wine: and thou shalt rejoice in thy 
feast, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy manservant, and 
thy maidservant, and the Levite, the stranger, and the fatherless, and 
the widow, that are within thy gates.
(Deut. 16: 11-14)
Here, the 'Egypt-'ebed-formula' appears again, as well as, most famously, 
in the regulation concerning Shabbat, the fourth commandment, in its 
Deuteronomy version:
Keep the Sabbath day to sanctify it, as the LORD thy God hath com­
manded thee. Six days thou shalt labour, and do all thy work: but 
the seventh day is the Sabbath of the LORD thy God: in it thou shalt 
not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man­
servant, nor thy maidservant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of 
thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; that thy manser­
vant and thy maidservant may rest as well as thou. And remember 
that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the LORO 
thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a 
stretched out arm: therefore the LORD thy God commanded thee to 
keep the Sabbath day.
(Deut. 5: 12-15)
In ancient societies, such as New Kingdom Egypt, it was not a prob­
lem to integrate strangers into the community. This is documented 
for instance by the fact that we find bearers of Semitic names in the 
highest offices of the state. The biblical story of Joseph, who ascends 
to a position second only to Pharaoh, gives a correct picture of this
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situation (Gen. 37-50). A historical example is the vizier of Akhenaten, 
a man named Abdi-El ('Servant of God').11 Nationality was not yet 
invented as a category of membership with special rights and rules of 
admission. The same seems to apply to other ancient societies as well. 
In this respect, Israel, with its strong ideas of covenant and fidelity, 
based on laws that were not only rules of behaviour but also condi­
tions of belonging, formed a clear exception. The Books of Exodus and 
Deuteronomy show Israel as a prototype of what later became the mod­
ern nation. The notions of 'resident stranger' (ger) and 'non-resident 
foreigner' (nokhri) have to be seen in the light of this new exclusive 
construction of national and religious identity. Mose, it is true, bears an 
Egyptian name, like other members of the Levite tribe such as Phineas 
(Pa-Nehsi 'the Nubian') or Putiel (Pa-di-El 'Gift of God' = Theodore). It 
was possible to become an Israelite by marriage as is shown by Moses' 
wife Zippora, a Midianite, and Ruth, the Moabite. This inclusive prac­
tice reflected in some of the narratives, however, was overturned by Ezra 
and Nehemia (at the very time when the Exodus narrative assumed its 
final literary shape), who radically closed this door with their merci­
less action against 'mixed marriages' after the return from Babylon.12 
In Deuteronomic and early 'covenantal' law, a stranger (ger) remained 
a stranger13, and an exception was only made for the Edomites and 
the Egyptians who were allowed to join the community in the third 
generation:
An Ammonite or Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of 
the LORD; even to their tenth generation shall they not enter into 
the congregation of the LORD for ever (...]
[However,] Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite; for he is thy brother: 
thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian; because thou wast a stranger in 
his land. The children that are begotten of them shall enter into the 
congregation of the Lord in their third generation.
(Deut. 23: 4; 6-7)
At first it may seem surprising that the exception granted to the 
Edomites - descendants from Abraham through Ishmael, the son of 
Hagar, the Egyptian concubine of Abraham - was extended also to the 
Egyptians. Given the sufferings of the Israelites in Egypt, one would 
have expected the Exodus narrative to found an eternal enmity between 
Israelites and Egyptians, but the opposite is true. The Egyptian experi­
ence, as transmitted in the memory of the Hebrew people, established 
not enmity but a sense of similarity, of something that both peoples have
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in common. We have already shown how the Exodus myth founded and 
defined Israelite identity in contradistinction to Egypt, from where the 
Chosen People had to be liberated in order to enter the Covenant that 
forms the constitution of its 'national' and religious identity. However, 
this opposition concerns only the harsh system of sacred kingship as 
represented in the person of Pharaoh, and not the Egyptian people 
themselves. It is the state (and its gods) that are perceived as oppres­
sive and cruel, not the population. There are even three passages in 
the text that present Egyptians in a favourable light: (1) The midwives 
Shifra and Puah (who are clearly Egyptian)14 assigned to assist the 
Hebrew women in giving birth and who refuse to obey Pharaoh's order 
to kill the male newborn (Exod. 1, 15-22); (2) The statement that 'God 
gave the people favour in sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto 
them such things as they required', viz. 'jewels of silver, and jewels of 
gold, and raiment' (Exod. 12, 35f.); and (3) The note that 'a mixed mul­
titude' of Egyptians and others joined the Israelites in their move-out 
(Exod. 12, 38; cf. Num. 11, 4) which precludes a purely ethnic definition 
of the emigrants. The most decisive argument, however, that warns us 
not to over-emphasize the difference between Israelites and Egyptians 
(or non-Israelites in general) is the similarity that is established by the 
book of Genesis between all nations as common descendants of Noah.15
The ideas of election and covenant construct a difference between 
Israel and the (other) nations (goyim) that is repeatedly emphasized 
without, however, suppressing the fact that the whole earth is God's and 
his care extends to all his creatures: 'Now therefore, if ye will obey my 
voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treas­
ure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine' (Exod. 19, 5)- 
The distinction between Israel and the nations does not have the qual­
ity of the distinction between friend and foe in the sense of a total 
negation of similarity that erects an insurmountable border and leaves 
no room for empathy.
There is, however, one exception to this liberal, universalistic, and 
humanistic view of the multi-national world as outlined in the book 
of Genesis. This concerns the indigenous inhabitants of the Promised 
Land, the Canaanites that are explicitly excluded from any empathetic 
attitude. Their expulsion and extermination is even prescribed as a 
sacred task and they are denied the very mercy that is commanded vis- 
a-vis the stranger: 'Thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; 
thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them 
(Deut. 7: 2, cf. the whole passage 7: 1-6, and similarly Exod. 23: 27-33; 
Exod. 34: 15f., Deut. 12: 2f., and many more).
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The prohibition of mercy is a classic example of the blocking of 
empathy towards a group that is denied any similarity and defined as 
the absolute other. Who are these Canaanites and how can we explain 
this uncompromising anti-Canaanism?16 We are dealing here with a 
hatred and an abomination turned against the past of the Israelites who 
were Canaanites themselves, worshipping Ashera and Ba’al alongside 
Yahveh - as the prophets kept scolding and reminding them - before 
converting to a pure monotheism during and after the Babylonian 
exile. What we have before us is the violent abomination of the convert 
towards a past that he has left behind. The story of Exodus and the iden­
tity it has shaped and is continuously shaping have to be interpreted 
not in the light of the Late Bronze Age, in which the events are situated, 
but in the light of the tense time in which the texts were written: the 
sixth and fifth centuries, and the foundation of Second Temple Judaism.
This historical explanation applies also to our point of departure: the 
exhortation to empathize with the stranger while remembering that 
one has been a stranger oneself in the land of Egypt. There is wide- 
ranging consensus among Biblical scholars that the Exodus never hap­
pened as an historical event. The Exodus is a matter of memory but not 
of history. This makes the connection between empathy and memory 
all the more interesting. Why does the Torah so emphatically insist on 
the Egyptian origin of the Israelites and on their suffering there as stran­
gers, oppressed with forced labour and genocidal persecution? If there 
is no historical basis for this event, what could the symbolic meaning of 
this myth of origin be?17 A possible answer can be found in a famous 
passage in Deuteronomy that gives a short version of this myth in the 
form of a confession or self-definition that the Israelite is supposed to 
recite when offering the first fruits, presumably at Sukkot:
A rambling Aramean was my father, and he went down into Egypt, 
and sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation, great, 
mighty, and populous: and the Egyptians evil entreated us, and 
afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage: and when we cried unto 
the LORD God of our fathers, the LORD heard our voice, and looked 
on our affliction, and our labour, and our oppression: and the LORD 
brought us forth out of Egypt with a mighty hand, and he hath 
brought us into this place, and hath given us this land, even a land 
that floweth with milk and honey. And now, behold, I have brought 
the firstfruits of the land, which thou, O LORD, hast given me.
And thou shalt set it before the LORD thy God, and worship before 
the LORD thy God: and thou shalt rejoice in every good thing which
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the LORD thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, 
thou, and the Levite, and the stranger that is among you.
(Deut. 26: 5-11)18
The 'rambling Aramean' is Jacob called Israel, the ancestor of the 
Israelites who have never been at home, living first as respected stran­
gers (gerim) in Canaan and then as oppressed strangers in Egypt before 
finally entering the Promised Land as full citizens. The symbolic mean­
ing of this history of 'ger'-ship is firstly to distinguish the Promised Land 
as the true home of the Israelites, secondly to declare them as 'allochtho­
nous'19 with regard to the land they are living in, thus setting them off as 
sharply as possible against the other indigenous inhabitants and thirdly 
to define them as a 'remembering' and therefore 'empathic society'. The 
memory of the (however symbolic and fictional) Egyptian past enables 
them to feel with the stranger, the poor, and the slave in their midst. The 
appeal to remember the Egyptian bondage appears in three contexts:
(1) You must not oppress the stranger, because you have been a stran­
ger yourself in Egypt
(2) You must not exploit the slave, because you have been a slave your­
self in Egypt
(3) You will only understand the meaning of the laws you are to 
observe if you do not forget that you were liberated from Egypt.
The self-definition of an Israelite requires that he sees him/herself as a 
former stranger, a former slave and a mindful freedman/woman (if only 
on condition of observing the law) who remembers his/her past. For 
the Israelites, the time of suffering in Egypt forms a defining element 
of their self-image and of their image of God. God is the liberator who 
redeemed them from Egyptian bondage and they themselves remained 
slaves but became servants of God who says: 'For unto me the children 
of Israel are servants; they are my servants whom 1 brought forth out of 
the land of Egypt' (Lev. 25: 55). This statement occurs in the context 
of the regulations concerning the year of jubilee when all the slaves 
in Israel have to be set free. With regard to this institution we read in 
Deuteronomy:
And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, be sold 
unto thee, and serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou 
shalt let him go free from thee. And when thou sendest him out free 
from thee, thou shalt not let him go away empty: thou shalt furnish
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him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy 
winepress: of that wherewith the LORD thy God hath blessed thee 
thou shalt give unto him. And thou shalt remember that thou wast 
a bondman in the land of Egypt, and the LORD thy God redeemed 
thee: therefore I command thee this thing to day.
(Deut. 15: 12-15)
For the Israelites, the past, however traumatic, however humiliating, 
matters because its memory makes them mindful, sensitizing them for 
the needs of the other and preventing them from ever exposing others 
to experiences like those they had made in Egypt. Empathy is conceived 
in these passages as a matter of memory rather than of immediate 
response or mirror-neurons. It is the past more than the present that 
makes a person or, in this case, a society empathetic. If you had not 
been strangers and slaves in Egypt, the texts seem to argue, you would 
not be able to create a new form of society where nobody is oppressed. 
Suffering receives a meaning in this line of argumentation and is rep­
resented as a form of education: mathein 'learning' through pathein 
'suffering', as the famous Greek dictum runs.20 Even if the motif of 
Egyptian bondage and suffering is a mythical fiction, the sufferings that 
the Israelites incurred from the hands of the Assyrians and Babylonians 
were as real and historical as can be.
The memory of Egyptian bondage - regardless of whether its histori­
cal or mythical - creates what Aleida Assmann has termed 'resonance'.21 
She uses resonance 'to describe the interactions or reverberations 
between an experience, on the one hand, and a psychic or cultural 
frame and emotional deep structure on the other'.22 The myth of the 
Exodus with its gripping description of the sufferings of the Israelites 
in Egypt provides the 'psychic or cultural frame and emotional deep 
structure' that informs the Jewish experience. If we realize the context 
of historical experiences within which the Exodus myth became acute: 
the fall of the Northern Kingdom of Israel through the Assyrian con­
quest and the mass deportation of Israelites ('the lost Ten Tribes') into 
Assyrian captivity (722 BCE), the catastrophe which the early prophets 
Hosea and Amos prophesied in alluding to the Exodus tradition, and the 
fall of the Southern Kingdom of Judah by the hands of the Babylonians 
(587 BCE) when these traditions were codified in the books of Exodus 
and Deuteronomy, we see what experiences and resonances were 
involved in creating the Jewish self-definition as a remembering and, 
for this reason, empathic society. This utopian self-image was devised 
in a traumatic or post-traumatic situation, in exile, as a blueprint for
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creating or recreating an ideal Jewish community after the return to the 
Promised Land.
In A. Assmann's terminology, the motif of Egyptian serfdom serves 
as a 'prefiguration'23 of the experiences that Israel was to make dur­
ing the Assyrian deportation and the Babylonian exile, as well as the 
experiences that Jews were exposed to during the Seleucid and Roman 
occupation of their country and during almost two millennia of living 
in the diaspora. 'All cultures', A. Assmann writes, 'create systems of pre­
figuration which help their members to cope with events and endow 
experience with meaning'.24 The myth of the Exodus, with its motifs 
of serfdom and liberation is a classic example of such a 'system of pre­
figuration', which has helped the Jewish people through their countless 
experiences of oppression and persecution.
Everyone familiar with the situation of the Palestinians in modern 
Israel, however, knows that the exhortation 'do not oppress the stran­
ger who lives in thy midst' is no longer the leading maxim of Israel's 
interior practice and politics. The resonance of Egyptian serfdom has 
been blotted out by an event that could no longer be integrated into the 
semantic framework of the Exodus tradition: i.e. the Shoah. For such 
events, A. Assmann introduces the term 'impact' as a complement to 
her concept of resonance, meaning
an event that is not prefigured, for which we have no cultural tem­
plates and schemata and which therefore stands out as direct and 
immediate (though not necessarily unmediated). It is the unexpected 
par excellence, which cannot be anticipated and which is not cultur­
ally prefigured.25
In modern Israel -1 am not referring here to anything like 'Jewish mental­
ity', but to explicit right-wing politics - the impact event of the Holocaust 
led to a blocking of memory and empathy, replacing the maxim 'do not 
oppress the stranger' and the myth of Exodus with the maxim 'never 
again a victim', and the myth of Masada.26
In all other respects, however, the memory of the Holocaust has 
led to a general sensitization to injustice, oppression, and violence. 
As Jeremy Rifkin argues, humankind is moving in the direction of 
becoming an 'empathic civilization'.27 The verse from which we started 
reminds us that this development is not only a matter of globalization 
and communication technology but of memory, and it is precisely the 
memory of the Holocaust, along with other traumata of the past such
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as colonization, wars of annihilation, and the Gulag, that has brought 
about this epochal change. In the same way as the Israelites were warned 
to never forget that they were slaves and strangers in Egypt in order 
to be able to feel with the underprivileged and to form an 'empathic 
civilization' where nobody will ever be oppressed, we are summoned to 
remember the holocaust in order to become an 'empathic civilization' 
and finally to arrive at a global enforcement of human rights.
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